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Summary 
1. In case of a vote to leave the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom would not 
leave the EU overnight. Instead, European Union law – and with it EU fundamental 
rights law – would (most probably) continue to apply until a date specified in a 
withdrawal treaty between the EU and the UK. 
2. EU law protects fundamental rights chiefly through the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and through EU anti-discrimination law laid down in various directives. 
3. The Charter is binding on the EU and its institutions in all circumstances; it is binding 
on public authorities in the UK and Scotland only when they are implementing EU 
law.  This means that the Charter does not (and cannot) act as the sole source of 
human rights protection at the national level. 
4. The UK does not have a general opt-out from the Charter under Protocol 30 to the 
Treaty of Lisbon.  It is still unclear, however, whether the UK has an opt-out from 
chapter IV of the Charter (on solidarity rights) under this Protocol. 
5. In case of a withdrawal from the EU, the Charter would no longer apply to the UK or 
in Scotland.  Individuals living here would therefore no longer be able to invoke 
Charter rights in national courts.  Given that – in contrast to rights guaranteed by the 
Human Rights Act – these EU rights can result in Westminster legislation being dis-
applied by a national court, withdrawal from the EU would result in a tangible loss of 
human rights protection in procedural terms. 
6. In addition, withdrawal from the EU there would also result in a substantive 
reduction of the human rights protection available to individuals living in the UK and 
Scotland.   
a. The Charter of Fundamental Rights guarantees more rights than the Human 
Rights Act.  Some rights, such as the ‘right to be forgotten’ and other data 
protection rights would disappear from UK and Scottish law unless they were 
replaced either by way of legislation or by judicial developments.  Other 
rights – in particular social rights – have not yet been fully defined by the 
Court of Justice of the EU.  It is clear, however, that a withdrawal from the EU 
would deprive people living in Scotland and the UK from benefiting from any 
future development in this area.   
b. In case a British Bill of Rights leads to a procedural or substantive reduction in 
the human rights protection in the UK and Scotland, the Charter would have 
a mitigating effect, which would be lost in the event of a withdrawal from the 
EU.  
c. The EU’s anti-discrimination directives are incorporated into the Equality Act 
2010, which –in the absence of parliamentary repeal – would continue to 
protect individuals even after an EU withdrawal.  However, the directives 
would no longer underpin anti-discrimination law in the UK so that a repeal 
or reduction in standards would become easier for Parliament to attain.  In 
addition, the UK would not have to follow future developments at the EU 
level so that individuals might be deprived of advancements in anti-
discrimination law happening there. 
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d. Furthermore, individuals living in the UK would no longer be capable of 
challenging EU legislation on the basis of the Charter even though some EU 
legislation might remain applicable within the UK after a withdrawal from the 
EU. 
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1. Background: the EU referendum and the withdrawal process 
On 23 June 2016 the electorate will be asked whether the United Kingdom should remain a 
member of the European Union (EU) or leave the European Union.  Article 50 of the Treaty 
on European Union – introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon – provides that a Member State 
‘may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional 
requirements’.  Within the UK legal order, the referendum finds its legal (and constitutional) 
basis in the European Union Referendum Act 2015.   
The referendum outcome itself would not have any immediate legal consequences for the 
UK’s EU membership.  Should there be a ‘leave’ vote, the UK would not leave the EU 
overnight.  Instead, the Westminster government would need to take the necessary steps 
for withdrawal from the EU (a so-called ‘Brexit’) outlined in Article 50 of the Treaty on 
European Union.1  This provision requires a Member State intending to withdraw from the 
EU to notify the European Council of its intention to do so.  Once this has been done, a 
period of negotiations starts.  A reading of Article 50 suggests that normally the legal 
ramifications of withdrawal are dealt with by an international agreement ‘setting out the 
arrangements for […] withdrawal’ between the withdrawing Member State (the UK) and the 
European Union.  The provision does not stipulate what precise questions the withdrawal 
agreement would deal with.  What is clear, however, is that the UK’s membership of the EU 
comes to an end when the withdrawal agreement enters into force.   
Article 50 further states that a withdrawal agreement should take into account the future 
relationship of the withdrawing Member State with the Union.  Three basic scenarios are 
conceivable for this future relationship: 1) the UK and the EU could conclude a specific and 
bespoke ‘deal’ (which can range in intensity from a basic free trade deal to ‘quasi-
membership’);  2) the UK could join the European Free Trade Association and the European 
                                                          
1 The wording of Article 50 is as follows:  
1.   Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own 
constitutional requirements. 
2.   A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention. In 
the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude 
an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the 
framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in 
accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It shall be 
concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the 
consent of the European Parliament. 
3.   The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the 
withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, 
unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides 
to extend this period. 
4.   For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of the European Council or of the Council 
representing the withdrawing Member State shall not participate in the discussions of the European 
Council or Council or in decisions concerning it. 
A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(b) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union. 
5.   If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to re-join, its request shall be subject to the 
procedure referred to in Article 49. 
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Economic Area (together with Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein)2; 3) no specific deal is 
agreed and both the UK and the EU rely on international law (e.g. WTO law) to govern their 
relationship.  If an agreement is made as to the future EU-UK relationship, this can either be 
done as part of the withdrawal agreement itself or in a separate agreement.  Again, nothing 
in Article 50 pre-determines the shape and form of this future relationship. 
Once the withdrawal agreement enters into force, the EU Treaties (and with them all EU 
law, including EU fundamental rights law) would cease to apply to the UK.  The withdrawal 
agreement could, however, stipulate that certain legal obligations under the EU Treaties 
continue to bind the UK and the EU and for how long this should be the case.   
It is additionally worth noting that Article 50 limits the period of negotiations to two years.  
If the UK and the EU cannot agree within two years of notification of the intention to 
withdraw, the Treaties equally cease to apply to the UK, unless the period for negotiations is 
extended.   
This paper written for the Scottish Human Rights Commission will at 2) briefly introduce the 
key features of the EU legal system before at 3) sketching the development of human rights3 
protection in EU law; it will then at 4) introduce how fundamental rights are protected at 
the EU level and at 5) elucidate on how these EU fundamental rights are woven into the 
legal orders of the UK and Scotland.  The paper discusses at 6) whether the UK 
government’s renegotiation of the UK’s EU membership affects human rights.  The final 
section will at 7) present the possible changes that a withdrawal from the EU might bring for 
fundamental rights protection in the UK and Scotland. 
 
  
                                                          
2 Note that Switzerland is a member of EFTA, but not the EEA; the Swiss-EU relationship is regulated through a 
large number of bilateral agreements and in many respects resembles the relationship of the EU with the EEA 
countries. 
3 Note that the terms ‘human rights’ and ‘fundamental rights’ are used interchangeably throughout this paper. 
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2. Key features of the European Union legal system 
The European Union legal system is characterised by a quasi-federal constitutional 
structure.  EU primary law consists of the EU Treaties (the Treaty on European Union; the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; and the Euratom Treaty), the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and the general principles of Union law.  EU secondary law must be in 
compliance with EU primary law.  It consists of regulations, which are directly applicable in 
the Member States; directives, which are binding on the Member States as to the result to 
be achieved and need to be transposed into national law (regulations and directives are EU 
legislative acts); and decisions, which usually have an addressee.  The prime example for 
these would be the European Commission’s decisions in the field of competition law (e.g. a 
decision to fine two companies for price-fixing).  There are also non-binding 
recommendations and opinions.4 
If there is a conflict between European Union law and national law, European Union law 
takes primacy over national law. This means that a national court must not apply the 
conflicting provision of national law, but is obliged to apply Union law instead.5  Notably, 
this does not mean that the national court must declare conflicting national law to be void; 
it is only not applicable in case of conflict.  The doctrine of primacy was developed by the 
Court of Justice of the EU in the landmark ruling of Costa v ENEL.  It was later interpreted to 
extend to all provisions of national law, including national constitutional law.6  Moreover, 
the Court of Justice held that all national courts – no matter how low in the hierarchy of 
courts they find themselves – are under the obligation to disapply national law conflicting 
with EU law.7  Viewed from the perspective of a national legal order, this shows the force of 
the principle of primacy: it must be given effect independently of procedural or 
jurisdictional constraints under national law.  In fact, even in Member States such as the UK 
that do not allow for the judicial review of legislation, national courts are under the 
obligation to give effect to the primacy of EU law and disapply conflicting legislation. 
In addition, European Union law is capable of having direct effect.  This means that it can be 
invoked by individual claimants in the courts of the Member States.  It is not necessary for 
national law to specifically provide for this.  Instead, direct effect means that EU law can be 
self-executing.  This was decided by the Court of Justice in the seminal case of Van Gend en 
Loos.8  Two conditions must be met for a provision to have direct effect: it must be precise, 
clear and unconditional; and it must not entail additional implementing measures.  Many EU 
law measures are in principle capable of having direct effect: Treaty provisions; the 
provisions of the EU Charter; regulations; and, exceptionally, even directives where they 
have not been implemented within the implementation period.9 
                                                          
4 See Article 288 TFEU. 
5 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL ECLI:EU:C:1964:66. 
6 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v Vorratsstelle für Futter und Getreide ECLI:EU:C:1970:114. 
7 Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA ECLI:EU:C:1978:49. 
8 Case 26/62 NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland 
Revenue Administration ECLI:EU:C:1963:1. 
9 Case 41/74 van Duyn v Home Office ECLI:EU:C:1974:133. 
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The UK’s obligations under EU law have been transposed into national law by the European 
Communities Act 1972.  The courts in the United Kingdom have held that Parliament has 
thereby accepted both the doctrine of primacy and the doctrine of direct effect. In its 
famous ruling in Factortame the House of Lords held that:  
If the supremacy within the European Community of Community law over the 
national law of Member States was not always inherent in the E.E.C. Treaty, it was 
certainly well established in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice long 
before the United Kingdom joined the Community. Thus, whatever limitation of its 
sovereignty Parliament accepted when it enacted the European Communities Act 
1972 was entirely voluntary. Under the terms of the Act of 1972 it has always been 
clear that it was the duty of a United Kingdom court, when delivering final judgment, 
to override any rule of national law found to be in conflict with any directly 
enforceable rule of Community law […] Thus there is nothing in any way novel in 
according supremacy to rules of Community law in those areas to which they 
apply.10 
This suggests that there are in principle no hurdles under UK law to invoke either doctrine in 
a national court.11 
As implied in the previous paragraphs, due to direct effect much of European Union law can 
be enforced in the courts of the Member States.  This is necessary chiefly because most 
European Union law is executed by Member State authorities.  Where a court in a Member 
State has a question on the interpretation of a provision of EU law or doubts the validity of a 
piece of EU legislation, it can – and where the validity of EU law is concerned must - ask the 
Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.12  The answers given in such a ruling are binding.  By 
contrast, direct access to the Court of Justice for individual claimants is very much 
restricted.  They can only bring a direct action where an EU measure (usually a decision) is 
addressed to them; or if this is not the case, only where it is of direct and individual concern 
to them.  This is a test that is very difficult to meet.13   
EU law is further enforced by the European Commission.  Where the Commission is satisfied 
that a Member State is not in compliance with its obligations it can bring that Member State 
before the Court of Justice.14 
 
  
                                                          
10 Regina v Secretary of State for Transport, Ex parte Factortame Ltd. and Others (No. 2) [1991] 1 AC 603 HL 
(per Lord Bridge). 
11 Note, however, that Lords Neuberger and Mance hinted at certain limits to this in R (HS2 Action Alliance Ltd) 
v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3. 
12 Article 267 TFEU; courts of last instance are additionally under a duty to refer cases on the interpretation of 
EU law to the CJEU. 
13 See Case 25/62 Plaumann v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1963:17; recently confirmed in Case C-583/11 P Inuit 
Tapiriit Kanatami and Others ECLI:EU:C:2013:625. 
14 Article 258 TFEU. 
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3. The development of human rights protection in the EU 
The European Union is not a human rights organisation.  Originally founded as an economic 
community, the protection of fundamental human rights was not an apparent concern for 
the original Member States and there was no mention made of human rights in the 
foundational Treaty of Rome.   
Fundamental rights were instead developed as unwritten (so-called) general principles of EU 
law by the Court of Justice.15  Subsequent Treaty revisions included express references to 
human rights in the Treaties16 and the current version of the Treaty on European Union 
mentions the ‘respect for human rights’ both in the preamble and as one of the values on 
which the Union is founded.17   
Moreover, the European Union adopted a Charter of Fundamental Rights, which became 
binding with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon.  The Charter expressly codifies the 
rights developed by the Court of Justice.  The fundamental rights guaranteed in the Charter 
can be invoked by individuals before the European courts, but also before national courts.  It 
is binding on the European Union and its institutions, as well as on the Member States, but 
only ‘when they are implementing Union law’.18   
While all Member States are bound by the European Convention on Human Rights (this is 
also a precondition for EU membership), the European Union itself is not (yet) a party to it 
even though the Lisbon Treaty foresees the EU’s accession to it.  Accession negotiations 
have encountered some difficulties following a decision by the Court of Justice of the EU, 
which declared that a draft agreement on EU accession was not compatible with the EU 
Treaties.19   Hence the draft agreement will have to be re-negotiated before accession can 
take effect. 
 
  
                                                          
15 Starting in 1969 with Case 29/69 Stauder v Stadt Ulm ECLI:EU:C:1969:57. 
16 Still found in Article 6 (3) TEU. 
17 See Article 2 TEU. 
18 For details see below. 
19 See Opinion 2/13 Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454. 
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4. Fundamental rights protection at the EU level  
a. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is the most prominent legal instrument for human 
rights protection in EU law.  The Charter has the same legal value as the Treaties20 and it is 
binding on all EU institutions.  It is also binding on the Member States, but only when they 
are implementing Union law.21  While this will be discussed in detail in the next section, it 
suggests that the main purpose of the Charter is to rein in the powers of the European 
Union rather than those of the Member States.  This means that all measures taken by the 
EU’s institution, including all EU legislation, must comply with the fundamental rights set out 
in the Charter.  If an EU legal act fails to do so and cannot be interpreted in conformity with 
fundamental rights, it is declared invalid by the Court of Justice. 
The Charter is legally independent from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 
but nonetheless closely connected to it.  The fifty-four articles of the Charter incorporate 
(and partly update) the rights contained in the ECHR.  Where Charter rights ‘correspond’ to 
rights guaranteed by the ECHR, ‘the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as 
those laid down by the said Convention’.22 Crucially, however, this ‘shall not prevent Union 
law providing more extensive protection’. This means that the Convention rights as 
interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights provide the minimum standard of 
human rights protection within the EU. 
The Charter additionally guarantees a number of rights not found in the ECHR (at least as far 
as it is binding on the UK).  These include freedom rights, such as a right to protection of 
personal data, freedom of the arts and sciences, the freedom of occupation and the right to 
conduct a business, and also a right to asylum and protection in the event of removal, 
expulsion or extradition as well as procedural rights, such as the right not to be punished 
twice.23  
The Charter additionally replicates the rights of EU citizens, which can already be found in 
the EU Treaties.24  And, more importantly perhaps, the Charter contains twelve articles in a 
chapter entitled ‘solidarity’.  These are provisions dealing with working conditions; access to 
social security and health care; prohibitions of child labour; the protection of young people 
at work and families; access to services of general economic interest. It also contains articles 
on environmental and consumer protection.   
These provisions must, however, be read in light of an important distinction in the Charter 
between rights and principles.  Many provisions in the ‘solidarity’ chapter are not fully 
fledged rights, but principles, i.e. they cannot be invoked in the courts without having first 
been implemented either by the Union or by the Member States.  This means that, in 
contrast to rights, they are only operative if either the Union or a Member State has 
                                                          
20 Article 6 (1) TEU. 
21 On this see the next section. 
22 See Article 52 (3) CFR. 
23 See Articles 8, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19, 50 respectively. 
24 Articles 20-25 TFEU. 
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legislated in an area – e.g. workers’ rights – and even then, they can only be invoked in the 
interpretation of that legislation or in a review of its validity.25  The Court of Justice has not 
yet clarified which provisions of the Charter, and in particular of the ‘solidarity’ chapter, 
contain rights and which contain principles, so that the law in this regard is still unclear. 
The Court of Justice has found a number of legal measures of the European Union to be 
incompatible with Charter rights and declared them invalid, many in the broad area of data 
protection.  For instance, it considered the EU’s Data Retention Directive to be incompatible 
with the right to private and family life contained in Article 7 and with the right to data 
protection in Article 8 of the Charter.26  This directive allowed national authorities to access 
individuals’ electronic communication data – e.g. time, duration, location, source and 
destination of mobile phone calls – for up to two years after the communication had taken 
place.  The Court considered this to be disproportionate and thus in violation of the Charter.  
In another case the Court took issue with a requirement contained in EU regulations that a 
number of personal details of the beneficiaries of agricultural subsidies had to be published 
online.27  
In a similar vein, the Court of Justice declared invalid a Commission decision that decreed 
that companies that sign up to the so-called ‘safe harbour principles’ did not violate EU data 
protection law if they transferred personal data from the EU to servers the United States.28  
One of the key reasons for this finding were revelations that US intelligence services had 
accessed personal data transferred from the EU to the US by the company ‘Facebook’.   
The Court also held an exception in the Equal Treatment Directive29 allowing insurers to take 
into account sex as a factor in the determination of insurance premiums to be incompatible 
with Articles 21 and 23 of the Charter, which prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex.30  
The Court of Justice further extended Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter to include a ‘right to be 
forgotten’.31  As a result individuals can ask internet search engines to no longer display as 
part of their search results websites containing information about that person if it relates to 
events in the past which might prejudice the individual concerned.32 
b. EU anti-discrimination law 
EU anti-discrimination law provides further protection for individuals.  The original Treaty of 
Rome contained a provision outlawing unequal pay for men and women, which was 
                                                          
25 See Article 51 (5) TFEU. 
26 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland v Minister for Communications, Marine and 
Natural Resources and Others and Kärntner Landesregierung and Others ECLI:EU:C:2014:238. 
27 Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Eifert ECLI:EU:C:2010:662. 
28 Case C-362/14 Maximilian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner ECLI:EU:C:2015:650. 
29 Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal treatment 
between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services [2004] OJ L373/37. 
30 Case C-236/09 Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL and Others v Conseil des ministres 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:100. 
31 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario 
Costeja González ECLI:EU:C:2014:317. 
32 It should be pointed out that there are limits to such a request, in particular if the person concerned played 
an important role in public life. 
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subsequently complemented by EU legislation outlawing sex discrimination more 
generally.33  In addition, the EU adopted directives outlawing race discrimination34 and 
discrimination on the basis of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.35  In 
many respects, EU anti-discrimination law has had more impact in practice than the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights.  This is because it applies between private parties – mainly in 
employment relationships36 – whereas the Charter is normally only binding on the Union 
and on the Member States.37  In addition, anti-discrimination law is binding on the Member 
States at all times whereas the Charter only binds them when implementing Union law (see 
below). 
c. Human rights mainstreaming 
As pointed out in the introduction, human rights form part of the values on which the 
European Union is founded.  Every state applying to join the EU must comply with these 
values, so that – in theory at least – all EU Member States must guarantee a minimum level 
of human rights protection in their legal orders.38  Where they fail to do so, the European 
Treaties foresee a sanctions mechanism39 even though this has never been used. 
The EU Commission’s strategy for implementing the Charter points out that the Union must 
be exemplary in making fundamental rights as effective as possible.  Hence fundamental 
rights compliance forms part of the European Commission’s ‘Better Regulation Guidelines’.40  
Fundamental rights play an important part in the impact assessment of the various policy 
options available to the Commission before a concrete proposal is made.  And each 
legislative proposal or other Commission measure must be checked for its compliance with 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
Human rights have also been mainstreamed into the external action of the European Union.  
The EU has appointed a special representative on human rights, whose task it is to increase 
the coherence, effectiveness and visibility of human rights in EU foreign policy.  The 
promotion of human rights features prominently in ‘political dialogues’ between the Union 
and non-Member States and it has been incorporated into various trade agreements 
concluded by the EU.   
                                                          
33 See Article 157 TFEU; the current incarnations of that legislation are Gender Directive; and Directive 
2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the 
principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and 
occupation (recast) [2006] OJ L204/23. 
34 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between 
persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin [2000] OJ L180/22. 
35 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation [2000] OJ L303/16. 
36 Note that race discrimination and gender discrimination are prohibited also in the supply of goods and 
services; whereas the remaining characteristics are protected only in the field of employment and occupation. 
37 The potential for horizontal effect of Charter rights has not yet been clarified by the Court. 
38 See Article 49 TEU. 
39 Article 7 TEU; the European Commission has introduced additional procedure designed to complement 
Article 7 TEU, see Commission Communication ‘A new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law’ 
COM(2014) 158 final/2. 
40 COM(2015) 215 final. 
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5. EU Fundamental rights protection in the UK and Scotland 
a. The human rights landscape in the UK and Scotland 
Human rights in the UK are chiefly protected by the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), which 
incorporates most of the rights contained in the ECHR by which the UK is bound.41  The HRA 
is binding on all ‘public authorities’, but cannot be used to override Acts of Parliament.  
Where an Act of Parliament is contrary to one of the rights protected by the HRA, higher 
courts can make a ‘declaration of incompatibility’.  This leaves the Act of Parliament intact, 
but serves the purpose of pointing out that the legislation is problematic in human rights 
terms and gives Parliament the opportunity to rectify this.  The HRA also provides for a fast 
track procedure to remove the incompatibility by way of a remedial (ministerial) order if 
there are compelling reasons for this.42 
Furthermore, the EU’s equality directives mentioned above have been incorporated into the 
Equality Act 2010.  The Equality Act builds on previously existing and ‘home-grown’ anti-
discrimination legislation, such as the various Race Relations Acts.43  Its scope is wider than 
what is required by European Union law in that it prohibits discrimination on all protected 
grounds also in the supply of goods and services.  European Union law, however, has 
considerably complemented and reinforced the development of anti-discrimination 
legislation in the UK.  For instance, the prohibition on discrimination on the basis of age, 
religion or belief, and sexual orientation can be traced back to EU law.44  The same can be 
said for the prohibition of discrimination because of gender reassignment.45   
The situation differs as far as Acts of the Scottish Parliament are concerned: section 29 of 
the Scotland Act provides that the Scottish Parliament acts outside its competence if an Act 
is ‘incompatible with Convention rights or with EU law’ (i.e. it is ultra vires).  The 
consequence is that such an Act ‘is not law’.  This provision therefore gives the courts the 
power to review Scottish legislation as to its human rights compatibility. 
The following discussion focuses on the applicability of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights in the UK and Scotland.  It first shows that the UK does not have a general opt-out 
from the Charter; second, it details the types of scenarios in which the Charter is applicable 
to alleged fundamental rights violations committed by UK or Scottish authorities.  This part 
also contains a case study demonstrating the different effects of the HRA and the Charter in 
a domestic setting. Third and finally, the discussion briefly addresses what a future British 
Bill of Rights might mean for the applicability of EU fundamental rights in the UK. 
                                                          
41 It protects all the rights contained in the original ECHR except Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) and 
the rights contained in the first Protocol to the ECHR.  
42 See s. 10 HRA. 
43 The Race Relations Act 1965 was the first piece of anti-discrimination legislation in the UK. 
44 These grounds have only been covered since the implementation of the Race Directive and the Framework 
Directive (see n 34) into UK law. 
45 While not expressly provided for in EU law, this goes back to a decision by the Court of Justice interpreting 
sex discrimination to entail discrimination against transsexuals, see Case C-13/94 P v S and Cornwall County 
Council ECLI:EU:C:1996:170. 
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b. Does the UK have an opt-out from the Charter? 
Protocol No 30 to the Lisbon Treaty, which deals with the application of the Charter to the 
UK and Poland, has by some been hailed as an opt-out of the UK from the Charter of 
fundamental rights.  Its wording, however, does not say that the UK is not bound by the 
Charter.  Instead it stipulates that the Charter ‘does not extend the ability’ of the Court of 
Justice or a national court to find that UK laws and practices are inconsistent with the 
fundamental rights ‘that it reaffirms’.  Given that the Charter is considered a codification of 
rights that already existed as ‘general principles’, the Court of Justice has held that the 
Protocol ‘does not call into question the applicability of the Charter in the United Kingdom.’   
Hence the UK does not have a general opt-out from the Charter. 
There is, however, some uncertainty as far as the Charter’s solidarity chapter IV is 
concerned.  The Protocol says that ‘nothing in Title IV of the Charter creates justiciable 
rights’ applicable to the UK except in so far as they have been provided for in UK law.  The 
Court of Justice has not yet decided what the implications of this part of the Protocol are.  
On one reading, the wording suggests that – as far as the UK is concerned – the provisions 
on ‘solidarity’ cannot be considered rights, but mere principles.  As explained above, 
principles offer weaker protection than rights in that they can only be invoked if they have 
first been implemented either by the Union or by the Member States.  Whereas many of the 
provisions in chapter IV must probably be considered principles, the Protocol suggests that 
even if they are not, they are not judicially cognisable in the UK without recognition in 
national law.  Hence if one adopted this reading of the Protocol one could conclude that the 
UK has a partial opt-out from the Charter.  On the other hand, one could also regard this 
part of the Protocol as a mere confirmation of the status quo, i.e. that the Protocol does not 
create new solidarity rights, but that those rights already existent as general principles of EU 
law would continue to apply in the UK.  There is thus a degree of uncertainty about the 
extent to which the provisions contained in chapter IV of the Charter are applicable in the 
United Kingdom. 
c. What is the influence of the EU Charter in the UK? 
Given that the UK has no general opt-out from the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the 
human rights guaranteed by it are applicable here.  However, reflecting the fact that the 
European Union possesses only those powers that have been conferred upon it by the 
Member States46 and given that the EU does not have power to legislate in the field of 
fundamental rights, the Charter is only binding on Member states in limited cases.  Hence 
there are areas of national sovereignty over which EU law, including Charter rights, does not 
have influence.47   
                                                          
46 Article 5 TEU. 
47 Article 53 of the Charter also suggests that the Charter, like the ECHR, constitutes a mere minimum standard 
of protection. However, the wording is deceptive: national fundamental rights that provide a stronger 
protection than the Charter cannot be invoked in order to circumvent the primacy of EU law.  This was shown 
in the case of Melloni where Spain was not allowed to refuse the execution of a European Arrest Warrant 
(which was fully compliant with EU law requirements including Charter rights) on the basis that the Spanish 
constitution provided for better protection against extradition (in that case concerning trials in absentia), see 
Case C-399/11 Stefano Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal ECLI:EU:C:2013:107. 
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The Charter states that it is only binding on the Member States ‘when they are 
implementing Union law’.48  Bearing in mind that most EU law is carried out by Member 
State authorities, the basic idea behind this phrase is that in such scenarios the Member 
States are acting as the ‘agents’ of the Union; and if the Union is bound by the Charter, the 
Member States should be bound by it if they are acting on behalf of the Union.  However, as 
will be demonstrated, this ‘agency model’ cannot explain all situations in which Member 
States must comply with the Charter. 
A Member State is deemed to implement EU law when it acts within the scope of EU law.  
This is typically the case in two types of situations.  First, situations where a Member State 
acts on the basis of EU law; and second cases where Member States derogate from 
European Union free movement law. 
i. Member States acting on the basis of EU law 
There is already a substantial body of case law concerned with the first type of situation.  
According to the leading decision in Åkerberg Fransson ‘the fundamental rights guaranteed 
in the legal order of the European Union are applicable in all situations governed by 
European Union law, but not outside such situations’.49  The most basic scenario in this 
regard is a Member State acting on the basis of an obligation laid down in European Union 
law, e.g. a regulation.  The Court of Justice has held that a Member State was ‘implementing 
Union law’ even where it made use of a discretionary power given to it by Union law.  Thus 
in the case of N.S., which concerned the return of asylum seekers under the Dublin II 
Regulation,50 the Court held that use of the discretionary power to process an asylum 
application even though under the regulation another Member State would be responsible 
for doing so, came within the scope of EU law so that Charter rights were applicable.51  This 
category of cases includes, for instance, a situation where a Member State issues a 
European Arrest Warrant.  Given that the legal basis for the European Arrest Warrant is 
found in EU law (in a so-called framework decision52), the Member State must comply with 
the rights laid down in the Charter when applying this framework decision.  For example, it 
must not issue a European Arrest Warrant where the person to be arrested has already 
been convicted (or cleared) of the alleged crime.53  Another example for this type of cases 
would be the recovery of unduly paid farm subsidies under the EU’s Common Agricultural 
Policy.54  These subsidies are administered by the Member States, and any claim for their 
recovery must be made by the relevant national authority (e.g. the Scottish Government for 
                                                          
48 See Article 51 (1) of the Charter. 
49 Case C-617/10 Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson ECLI:EU:C:2013:105, para 19. 
50 Council Regulation 343/2003/EC establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State 
responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country 
national [2003] OJ L50/1. 
51 Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 N.S. v Secretary of State for the Home Department ECLI:EU:C:2011:865 
para 68. 
52 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the 
surrender procedures between Member States [2002] OJ L 190/1. 
53 See Article 50 of the Charter, which contains the rule against double jeopardy (or ne bis in idem). 
54 E.g. under Article 73 of Commission Regulation 796/2004 national authorities must recover unduly paid 
subsidies from farmers plus interest. 
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Scotland; the Rural Payments Agency for England).  Again, the national authority must 
comply with the rights contained in the Charter, e.g. there has to exist an effective remedy 
before the courts allowing farmers to challenge such a claim.55 
However, determining the scope of European Union law, and thus of the Charter, is not 
always straightforward as the case of Åkerberg Fransson itself demonstrates.  That case 
concerned criminal proceedings brought for tax evasion.  The defendant claimed a violation 
of the double jeopardy principle found in Article 50 of the Charter.  The defendant had 
provided the national (Swedish) exchequer with false information leading inter alia to a loss 
in value added tax revenue.  He was fined by the Swedish tax authorities and subsequently 
criminally prosecuted.  The provision in the criminal code on which the prosecution was 
based pre-dated Sweden’s EU membership and generically makes it an offence to ‘provide 
false information to the [tax] authorities’.  Even though the prosecution appeared to be 
based on Swedish law only, the Court of Justice considered it to constitute an 
implementation of Union law.  This was because an EU directive places Member States 
under an ‘obligation to take all legislative and administrative measures appropriate for 
ensuring collection of all the VAT due on its territory and for preventing evasion.’56  In 
addition, Member States were under an obligation to counter illegal activities affecting the 
financial interests of the EU; and VAT revenue directly affects the EU budget.57  Hence the 
Court of Justice held the Swedish provision of criminal law sanctioning tax evasion to 
constitute an implementation of Union law.  For this reason Charter rights were applicable 
in the case.58 
The example of Åkerberg Fransson shows that in some cases it may prove difficult to decide 
with confidence whether a legal situation falls within the scope of European Union law.  The 
Court of Justice provided an indicative checklist in Siragusa: 
In order to determine whether national legislation involves the implementation of 
EU law for the purposes of Article 51 of the Charter, some of the points to be 
determined are whether that legislation is intended to implement a provision of EU 
law; the nature of that legislation and whether it pursues objectives other than those 
covered by EU law, even if it is capable of indirectly affecting EU law; and also 
whether there are specific rules of EU law on the matter or capable of affecting it.59 
Charter rights – in particular procedural rights laid down in Chapter VI of the Charter – are 
also applicable to national court proceedings where the national court is deemed to be 
implementing Union law.  This would primarily be the case where the national court is 
determining claims founded on European Union law.  For instance, in DEB the claimant was 
relying on a remedy for state liability found in EU law.  Hence it was able to rely on the right 
                                                          
55 See Article 47 of the Charter. 
56 Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson (n 49) para 25; the directive referred to is Council Directive 
2006/112/EC on the common system of value added tax [2006] OJ L 347/1. 
57 Ibid, para. 26. 
58 The defendant was unsuccessful in invoking Article 50 of the Charter, however. 
59 Case C-206/13 Cruciano Siragusa v Regione Sicilia - Soprintendenza Beni Culturali e Ambientali di Palermo 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:126, para 25. 
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to effective judicial protection laid down in Article 47 of the Charter in order to challenge 
German rules excluding legal persons from claiming legal aid.60  The Benkharbouche case – 
discussed as a case study below – is a further example.  Here the applicants (partly) based 
their claims on national rules implementing EU directives and were thus able to invoke 
Article 47 of the Charter. 
ii. Member States derogating from EU free movement law 
Member States are also bound to comply with Charter rights when they are derogating from 
one of the four freedoms of the EU: free movement of goods, persons, services and 
capital.61  The same is true for derogations from the rules on the free movement of EU 
citizens and their family members.  Such derogations are possible in a limited number of 
circumstances, in particular in order to protect public policy or public security.62   
Two situations can be distinguished here: first, Member States can restrict these freedoms 
in certain (exceptional) circumstances, but if they do this, they must not violate the rights 
contained in the Charter.  Thus for instance, if a Member State regulates broadcasting 
services from other Member States, it must comply with Article 11 of the Charter, which 
guarantees freedom of expression.63  Another example would be that a Member State must 
comply with the right to conduct a business in Article 16 of the Charter if it subjects the 
operation of gambling machines to a licencing requirement provided that this requirement 
also affects an operator of such machines based in another Member State.64  In these 
scenarios Charter rights are an important factor in balancing whether the derogation from a 
fundamental freedom is proportionate. 
The second situation concerns cases where the Member State relies on the fundamental 
rights in the Charter themselves in order to limit the exercise of certain free movement 
rights.  For instance, in Schmidberger Austria decided to allow a demonstration by 
environmentalists against the amount of traffic on the major route crossing the alps, which 
involved a blockade of that route for some time.  This constituted a restriction on the free 
movement of goods.  However, the Court of Justice considered it justified if the restriction is 
necessary in order to enable the demonstrators to exercise their fundamental rights to 
expression and assembly guaranteed in Articles 11 and 12 of the Charter.65  It is important 
to note in this regard that as part of the proportionality assessment in such cases the Court 
of Justice requires a balancing to take place between the fundamental freedom on the one 
side and the fundamental right on the other.  This balancing does not always result in the 
fundamental right prevailing as the (in-)famous case of Viking shows.66  In that case Viking 
Lines – a ferry operator – was subjected to and threatened with collective action by the 
                                                          
60 Case C-279/09 DEB Deutsche Energiehandels- und Beratungsgesellschaft ECLI:EU:C:2010:811 
61 See Articles 34, 45, 49, 55, and 63 TFEU; in this regard the ‘agency model’ is not entirely accurate as such 
derogations can hardly be said to be made ‘on behalf of the Union’. 
62 See e.g. Article 36 TFEU or Article 45 (3) TFEU. 
63 Case C-260/89 Elliniki Radiophonia Tiléorassi AE (ERT) ECLI:EU:C:1991:254. 
64 Case C-390/12 Pfleger ECLI:EU:C:2014:281. 
65 Case C-112/00 Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v Republik Österreich 
ECLI:EU:C:2003:333. 
66 Case 438/05 Viking ECLI:EU:C:2007:772 
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Finnish Seamen’s Union and the International Transport Workers’ Federation for its plans to 
operate one of its ferries under an Estonian flag rather than a Finnish flag.  The re-flagging of 
the vessel from the flag of one EU Member State to that of another constitutes an exercise 
of a company’s freedom of establishment under Article 49 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union.  In the case of Viking the purpose was to save costs as the operation 
of a vessel under an Estonian flag would lead to Estonian law governing the employment 
relationship of the crew.  The International Transport Workers’ Federation called upon its 
members – among them the relevant Estonian union – to refrain from negotiating with 
Viking; and the Finnish union threatened strike action.  The Court of Justice recognised that 
the right to strike was a fundamental right.67  However, it considered the collective action a 
restriction of the fundamental freedom so that it needed to be justified.  In concrete terms 
this meant that both rights needed to be balanced.68   
iii. The practical influence of the Charter in the UK 
Given many Charter rights mirror the rights guaranteed by the HRA, its practical influence is 
in many cases negligible, in particular where the claimant challenges acts of the UK’s various 
executives.  As the following case study will demonstrate, however, it is more potent than 
the HRA when it comes to primary legislation. 
Case study:  
The practical difference between invoking the HRA and the Charter – Benkharbouche and 
Janah 
This Court of Appeal decision dealt with the question whether human rights can be invoked 
in order to restrict the scope of the State Immunity Act 1978.69  The two claimants 
respectively worked as a cook and a member of the domestic staff of two foreign embassies 
in London.  They brought claims of unfair dismissal, failure to pay the minimum wage, 
breaches of the Working Time Regulations 1998, racial discrimination and harassment, and 
arrears of pay.  The State Immunity Act confers general immunity from jurisdiction on other 
states, i.e. in strict application of the Act neither claim could be successful as the 
respondents were immune from jurisdiction.   
The Court of Appeal considered whether this general immunity from jurisdiction was a) 
compatible with Article 6 of the ECHR as guaranteed by the HRA; and b) with Article 47 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights.  Both provisions are nearly identically worded and 
guarantee the right to fair proceedings, implicit in which is a right of access to a court.  The 
Court of Appeal recognised that these rights can be limited and that immunity from 
jurisdiction – as required by international law – can be such a limit.  However, it came to the 
conclusion that the limitations on these rights went too far and were disproportionate.   
The judgment revealed stark differences in the consequences of claims based on the HRA 
and claims based on the Charter.  Unfair dismissal, failure to pay the minimum wage, and 
                                                          
67 This was before the entry into force of the Charter; now see its Article 28. 
68 A parallel scenario arose in Case 341/05 Laval ECLI:EU:C:2007:809. 
69 Benkharbouche v Embassy of the Republic of Sudan; Janah v Lybia [2015] EWCA Civ 33. 
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arrears of pay are based solely on domestic (English) law, whereas the claims based on the 
Working Time Regulations and racial discrimination and harassment are based on domestic 
law implementing EU directives.70  Hence those parts of the claims came within the scope of 
EU law and Charter rights could be invoked in their regard. 
As far as the claims based on English law were concerned, the Court of Appeal made a 
declaration of incompatibility under the HRA.  This means that the claimants still lost their 
case as far as these claims are concerned, but there is a prospect that Parliament will amend 
the State Immunity Act and make it human rights compatible for future cases.  By contrast, 
as far as the claims based on EU law were concerned, the Court of Appeal ‘disapplied’ the 
State Immunity Act, i.e. it did not consider the two respondents immune from jurisdiction, 
so that a remedy can be granted to them.  This is because EU law – in sharp contrast to the 
law of the ECHR, which the HRA incorporates – has primacy over conflicting national law.71   
For this reason the rights contained in the Charter are stronger than those provided for by 
the HRA because they can lead to the disapplication of legislation; however, the key 
weakness of the Charter is that it only applies when a Member State is implementing EU 
law.  This can lead to split results as this case study demonstrates. 
An important theme in the public discussion around human rights is whether these rights 
unduly restrict the United Kingdom’s ability to ‘deport foreign criminals’.  It is therefore 
appropriate to briefly show that by contrast to the HRA, the Charter has not yet had a great 
impact on the rights of non-British nationals trying to avoid expulsion or extradition by 
invoking the right to family life.  The Court of Justice has made reference to that right, which 
is contained in Article 7 of the Charter, mainly in order to bolster the rights that EU citizens 
and their family already enjoy under EU free movement law.  EU citizens may reside in other 
EU Member States if they have work or are self-employed; if they are students; or in case 
they do not work if they have sufficient resources to support themselves and their family as 
well as comprehensive medical insurance.72  Having exercised their right to free movement 
in this way, EU citizens returning to their home Member State can continue to rely on their 
rights under EU law.73  The right to family life has, for instance, been used to support the 
free movement rights of a British citizen resident in the UK, whose wife from a non-EU 
Member State was looking after his children while he was periodically away on business in 
other Member States.74  Equally, in a case concerning the question whether the family of a 
German national who used to be employed in the UK was allowed to stay there in order to 
allow the children to complete their education, the Court of Justice interpreted the relevant 
                                                          
70 The Race Directive (see n 34) and Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 
November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time [2003] OJ L299/9 respectively. 
71 See Costa v ENEL; this was recognised for the UK by the House of Lords in Regina v Secretary of State for 
Transport, Ex parte Factortame Ltd. and Others (No. 2) (per Lord Bridge). 
72 Article 7 of Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right 
of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States [2004] OJ L157/77. 
73 Case C-370/90 The Queen v Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Surinder Singh, ex parte Secretary of State for 
Home Department ECLI:EU:C:1992:296; Case C-456/12 O and B v Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:135. 
74 Case C-60/00 Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home Department ECLI:EU:C:2002:434. 
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EU legislation in light of the right to family life.75  There are even exceptional cases in which 
a family member of an EU citizen can invoke EU free movement rights and therefore the 
Charter where no movement by the EU citizen concerned.  These are mainly cases where 
the EU citizen is a minor and their primary carer (usually a parent) is a non-EU citizen who is 
threatened with expulsion.76  Indeed, in a  case currently pending before the Court of Justice 
concerning the Moroccan mother and sole carer of a child who is a UK citizen, the question 
arises whether the mother, who had served a 12 month sentence for a criminal offence, can 
be deported to Morocco.  The Court of Justice’s Advocate General suggested in a non-
binding opinion that any decision to deport the sole carer of an EU citizen must be 
proportionate and must not deprive the child of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of 
his rights as an EU citizen.  The Advocate General pointed out that an important factor in the 
determination of the proportionality of the deportation order at issue was the child’s right 
to family life.77   
d. The discussion on a British Bill of Rights 
Political discussions are currently underway to repeal the HRA and replace it with a British 
Bill of Rights.  As pointed out above, the HRA transposes the UK’s obligations under the 
European Convention on Human Rights and therefore has nothing to do with the UK’s EU 
membership.  Nonetheless, senior politicians like the Lord Chancellor have suggested that 
the Bill of Rights could be used to also address the effect of the Charter in the UK: first, by 
ensuring that Protocol No 30 would be adhered to78; and second, by introducing a 
mechanism that would make the Supreme Court a constitutional court, which would allow it 
to deny EU law (and possibly certain Charter rights) effect in UK law.79  As there are no 
concrete proposals currently on the table, it is impossible to predict the concrete impact this 
may have on the protection of human rights in the UK and Scotland.80  However, it is 
suggested that it could lead to a weakening of fundamental rights protection in individual 
cases.  The consequences of a possible withdrawal of the UK from the EU will be assessed in 
this light in section 7. 
 
                                                          
75 Case C-413/99 Baumbast v Secretary of State for the Home Department ECLI:EU:C:2002:493. 
76 See Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi ECLI:EU:C:2011:124. 
77 Case C‑304/14 Secretary of State for the Home Department v CS (Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar) 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:75, para 172. 
78 Note, however, that the UK does not have a general opt-out from the Charter.  Thus a reference to Protocol 
30 might well be entirely symbolic and devoid of substance. 
79 See transcript of evidence given by the Lord Chancellor Michael Gove on 2 February 2016 to the House of 
Lords EU Justice Sub-Committee, 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-justice-
subcommittee/potential-impact-of-repealing-the-human-rights-act-on-eu-law/oral/28347.html  
80 It is still not clear in how far the British Bill of Rights would be (fully) applicable in Scotland as it raises 
complex devolution issues, which the UK government might want to avoid. 
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6. The UK’s Renegotiated EU Membership 
Before calling the referendum, the Prime Minister negotiated new conditions for the UK’s 
membership in the European Union.81  The results of this renegotiation are contained – as a 
decision of the heads of state and government of the twenty-eight EU Member States – in 
the conclusions of the European Council of 18-19 February 2016.  The decision addresses 
four themes: economic governance (mainly the UK’s position as a Member State that does 
not use the euro as its currency); competitiveness; sovereignty; social benefits and free 
movement.  The renegotiation does not directly deal with the fundamental rights protected 
by EU law.  It only mentions the Charter in so far as it recalls the content of Article 1 (1) of 
Protocol 30 to the Lisbon Treaty word for word and quotes the Protocol in brackets.  As 
shown above, Article 1 (1) of the Protocol did not result in an opt-out of the UK from the 
Charter, so that – as far as the Charter is concerned – the ‘renegotiation deal’ merely 
confirms the status quo.   
The only aspect of the deal that could be perceived to be reducing the fundamental rights of 
EU citizens is the possibility afforded to the UK to limit the payment of in-work benefits for 
EU nationals in case of an ‘inflow of workers from other Member States of an exceptional 
magnitude over an extended period of time’ (the so-called emergency break).  This would 
allow the UK to continue paying such benefits to its own nationals, while at the same time 
denying them to newly arrived EU nationals.  This could be considered a violation of the 
right to non-discrimination found in Article 21 (2) of the Charter.  However, it should be 
noted that this right is not limitless and the compatibility of this emergency break 
mechanism with the Charter has not yet been tested before the Court of Justice. 
 
  
                                                          
81 See European Council conclusions, 18-19 February 2016 (EUCO 1/16) 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/uk/2016-uk-settlement-process-timeline/ . 
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7. What Would Change if the UK left the European Union? 
a. Introductory remarks 
Finally, this paper needs to address in how far a possible ‘Brexit’ would affect the human 
rights protection available in Scotland and in the UK.  It is important to point out that much 
of what follows is the outcome of informed speculation.  As long as it is unclear what the 
exact ramifications of a future relationship between the UK and the EU would be if the UK 
left the EU, it is impossible to make precise predictions.82  However, it is probably fair to 
suggest that any post-Brexit relationship would be mainly concerned with trade relations 
and less with the protection of fundamental rights.  This is evident from the ‘renegotiation 
deal’, which only mentions the Charter peripherally.  Equally, the Brexit campaigns are fairly 
silent on fundamental rights issues, apart from the commonplace confusion between the 
ECHR/HRA-regime and the EU-regime. 
It is certain that a possible withdrawal of the UK from the EU has no impact upon the UK’s 
commitment to ECHR and on the continued application of the rights guaranteed in the HRA 
or in a future British Bill of Rights.  Hence it is most likely that human rights will continue to 
be protected in the UK even in the event of a Brexit.   
The consequences of a Brexit for the protection of fundamental rights in the UK can 
therefore be summarised as depriving people living in the UK firstly from the additional 
human rights guarantees contained in the Charter – both procedurally and substantively; 
and secondly from the opportunity to benefit from future improvements of fundamental 
rights protection at the EU level – be it through treaty change, legislation or through case 
law.  These two considerations pervade the following discussion. 
b. The Charter would cease to be binding on the UK 
One can predict with relative certainty that the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights would 
cease to be binding on the UK in case of a Brexit.  While it is not a legal impossibility for a 
non-Member State to commit to the Charter, there is no precedent for this.  In particular 
EEA (and EFTA) membership – which would be the closest currently existing relationship 
between the EU and a non-Member State – does not make the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights binding on non-EU Member States.  This would mean that people living in the UK 
would therefore no longer be able to invoke the rights contained in the Charter.   
As far as the Charter mirrors the ECHR this would not always result in a reduction of 
fundamental rights protection in practice.  However, there are three conceivable scenarios 
in which this would be the case.   
First, as the above case study shows, there would be a procedural difference notably where 
the review of (Westminster) primary legislation is at issue.  Under the HRA the only option 
open to (higher) courts is a declaration of incompatibility, which still results in the applicant 
losing her case with the prospect of the defective legislation being remedied in the future.  
By contrast, if the human rights violation occurred within the scope of EU law, then the 
                                                          
82 The key scenarios for a post-Brexit relationship were briefly outlined in section 1. 
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court (of whatever rank in the hierarchy) is under a duty to disapply the piece of 
incompatible legislation and the applicant will win his case. 
Second, certain rights guaranteed in the Charter are not reflected in the ECHR – at least as 
far as the UK as signed up to it – and cannot therefore be invoked before UK courts through 
the medium of the HRA.  Hence, in the event of a Brexit there would be consequences for 
the substantive protection of human rights in the UK.  People living here would lose these 
rights in their entirety – unless of course, these were incorporated into a British Bill of 
Rights.  An important example of a right currently only guaranteed in EU law, but not by the 
ECHR, would be the ‘right to be forgotten’ mentioned above.83  Additionally, there are the 
social rights (or principles – see above) contained in the Charter, which would no longer be 
at the disposal of people in the United Kingdom.   
Third, the UK’s own human rights settlement is currently under review and likely to be 
altered.  The question whether a British Bill of Rights might lead to a reduction in the overall 
protection of human rights in the UK is unclear.  In particular, it remains to be seen whether 
a British Bill of Rights will continue to adhere to the rights formulated in the ECHR or 
propose a new set of newly formulated rights; whether the duty to take into account 
Strasbourg case law will remain in place84; whether the duty to interpret (Westminster) 
legislation as far as possible in conformity with human rights continues85; whether higher 
courts will remain competent to make declarations of incompatibility; and – for Scotland – 
whether section 29 of the Scotland Act will continue to hold Acts of the Scottish Parliament 
ultra vires if they are contrary to human rights.   
If the UK continued in its membership of the EU, the Charter would most likely have a 
mitigating effect on such a reduction in the domestic protection of human rights as far as it 
is applicable: it makes the ECHR (as interpreted in the ECtHR’s case law) the minimum 
standard for human rights in the EU86; any national legislation must – if at all possible – be 
interpreted in conformity with a Member State’s EU law obligations, including those arising 
from the Charter87; if this is not possible, that national legislation – no matter of which rank 
– must be disapplied; and if the UK continued to be a Member of the EU, it is likely that 
section 29 of the Scotland Act would continue to lead to Acts of the Scottish Parliament that 
are contrary to EU law to be ultra vires.  In the event of a Brexit, this mitigating potential of 
the Charter would no longer be realisable.88  
                                                          
83 Of course, the UK courts could develop such a right independently, but there is no evidence that such a 
development is imminent. 
84 Section 2 (1) HRA. 
85 Section 3 HRA. 
86 See Article 52 (3) CFR and the explanations to it; these can be found in [2007] OJ C 303/17, 33. 
87 See e.g. Case 14/83 Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen 
ECLI:EU:C:1984:153; and Case C-106/89 Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA 
ECLI:EU:C:1990:395. 
88 Of course this analysis must be placed under the caveat that a British Bill of Rights might attempt to limit the 
domestic law effects of the Charter (which would be contrary to EU law). 
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c. People living in the UK would no longer benefit from developments under the Charter 
Closely connected to the former sub-section is the concern that in the event of a withdrawal 
from the EU, people living in the UK would no longer be able to benefit from the potential 
that the Charter of Fundamental Rights offers.  As hinted at above, there is not yet much 
case law on the substance of many of the Charter rights, but the sheer breadth of rights 
(and principles) offered in the Charter and their often broader formulation compared with 
corresponding rights contained in the ECHR, suggest a large potential for improvements, 
from which the UK and the people living there would be excluded in the event of Brexit.  
The most obvious category of rights and principles that one can point to are those found in 
the solidarity chapter, most of which can be classed as social rights.89  This would, of course, 
not exclude the UK legislator(s) from mirroring any developments taking place at the EU 
level.  But people living in the UK would not be able to directly profit from any future 
development of these provisions.   
But even outside the solidarity chapter, the Charter contains important updates of rights 
recognised in the ECHR.  Apart from data protection rights90, there are, for example, a 
guarantee of human dignity; a right to physical and mental integrity; a prohibition on human 
trafficking; the right to conscientious objection; a right to marry that is not restricted to 
different-sex couples; a right to asylum; and a broader fair trial guarantee that is not 
restricted to civil and criminal cases.91 
d. Challenges to EU legislation on the basis of the Charter will become impossible 
In the event of a UK withdrawal from the EU, the Charter would continue to be binding on 
the EU and its institutions.  Thus, if a post-Brexit deal foresaw – as is the case with Norway 
and Switzerland – that the UK would continue to be bound by some EU legislation, that 
legislation would need to be compatible with the Charter.  Under current arrangements 
individuals in the UK affected by such EU legislation can challenge it in the UK courts.  They 
would need to make an argument to that effect in domestic proceedings and if the court 
concerned then asks the Court of Justice for a so-called preliminary ruling on this question, 
the Court of Justice will decide whether the provision concerned is compatible with 
fundamental rights or not.  After the UK has left the EU, it is unlikely that this option would 
continue to exist.  It would then depend on whether the courts in the UK would be given an 
equivalent power of review – which, it needs to be pointed out, might be contrary to the 
UK’s international obligations towards the EU.  Hence it may well happen that persons in the 
UK, including businesses, might be bound by pieces of EU legislation without being able to 
challenge them on human rights (or other) grounds.  
e. Migration and expulsion of unwanted immigrants 
As far as the politically sensitive issue of immigration (and the removal of unwanted non-
nationals) is concerned, it was shown above that, in contrast to the ECHR and the HRA, the 
Charter has not played a prominent role in this field.  Under EU law, immigration cases are 
                                                          
89 But bear in mind the caveat that there might be an opt-out from this in Article 1 (2) of Protocol 30: for a 
discussion see above. 
90 See above. 
91 See Articles 1; 3; 5 (3); 10 (2); 9; 18 and 47 of the Charter respectively. 
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usually resolved on the basis of EU free movement and citizenship law with Charter rights 
playing a supporting role rather than being used as the sole reasons, e.g. to block a 
deportation.  Of course, if the UK left the EU, EU free movement law would cease to apply 
and thus deportation of criminal EU citizens and their families might become easier for that 
reason.   
However, it should be pointed out that any post-withdrawal relationship involving full 
access to the single market would necessarily involve full access of EU citizens to the labour 
market of the UK.  This is for instance the case for countries like Norway, Iceland or 
Switzerland.  Hence migration from the EU/EEA to the UK might be as difficult to control 
freely as it is now as the arrangements might only differ in some minute details from 
present arrangements.  However, in the event of a Brexit the Charter would in all likelihood 
not apply in such cases so that it would lose its current function of backing up claims by EU 
migrants trying to avoid expulsion. 
f. EU anti-discrimination law: a future that is difficult to predict 
As far as anti-discrimination law is concerned, the future is rather difficult to predict.  By 
contrast to the Charter, the EU’s equality directives are not directly applicable in the UK, but 
they have been transposed into the Equality Act, which is an Act of Parliament.  This Act 
would remain in force after the UK left the EU unless it were expressly repealed.   
A Brexit would have two possible consequences for anti-discrimination law, however.  First, 
at the moment large parts of the Equality Act are underpinned by the UK’s obligations under 
EU law.  In other words, the UK must protect individuals against various types of 
discrimination, harassment, and victimisation.  If the UK left the EU, these obligations would 
in all likelihood cease to exist, so that parts of the Equality Act could be repealed or changed 
by Parliament without hindrance from EU law.  Whether this would be on the political 
agenda of the present government or future governments, is of course a different question.  
Suffice it to point out that there would no longer be any legal constraints to changes to the 
Equality Act.  
Second, should there be future developments in EU anti-discrimination law, the UK would 
not automatically take part in them and would not have to adapt its laws to comply.  Again, 
it is difficult to predict what changes there might be and whether – if the UK remained in the 
EU – these changes would require amendments to the Equality Act given that that Act 
protects individuals in more circumstances than is strictly required by EU law.92  Two types 
of development at EU level are conceivable here: legislative and judicial.  Given the limited 
legal basis for legislative activity in Article 19 TFEU93, developments of anti-discrimination 
law are more likely to be driven by the Court of Justice.  Past experience shows that these 
developments can be significant as for instance the finding of sex discrimination in favour of 
                                                          
92 The Equality Act knows three additional characteristics (gender reassignment; pregnancy and maternity; 
marriage or civil partnership); in addition, all characteristics (save for marriage and civil partnership) are 
protected in the supply of goods and services whereas EU law only requires this for racial discrimination. 
93 Restriction to the six grounds already legislated on and the unanimity requirement make further 
development beyond what is already guaranteed under the Equality Act unlikely. 
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a post-operative transsexual in P v S.94  If the UK left the EU, such developments would no 
longer be automatically effective in the UK. 
g. The flipside: fewer human rights constraints on the UK’s parliaments 
If the Charter ceased to apply in the UK, the UK Parliament would face fewer legal 
constraints when making law.  The same would be true for the Scottish Parliament 
considering that after leaving the EU, the section 29 of the Scotland Act would probably be 
amended and no longer refer to EU law. 
However, some constraints are likely to remain if the UK chose to partake in certain EU 
measures.  A likely field of cooperation would be justice and home affairs, in particular the 
European Arrest Warrant or the Schengen Information System. This would need to be 
separately agreed upon with the European Union by way of an international treaty.  It is 
likely that in such a case the UK would have to continue to adhere to the fundamental right 
of ne bis in idem (the rule against double jeopardy) laid down in Article 54 of the Schengen 
Convention.95  
                                                          
94 P v S and Cornwall County Council (n 45). 
95 This is in any event the case for Norway and Iceland, see Agreement concluded by the Council of the 
European Union, the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway on the association of these two states to 
the implementation, to application and to the development of the acquis de Schengen - final Act [1999] OJ L 
176/36. 
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